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Mobile Malware Taxonomy

Mobile Malware Analysis · Mobile Advanced Security track

11 min read

In this module

The Mobile Threat Landscape

Mobile malware fights uphill in ways desktop malware never had to. App sandboxing, mandatory code signing, curated stores, restricted IPC — every one of those constraints shapes what mobile authors can ship. The ecosystem is enormous and lucrative anyway, and steadily getting cleverer.

Knowing the taxonomy — the categories, how they spread, how they hang on — is the floor you stand on for everything else.

Malware Categories

Banking Trojans

Banking trojans are where the real money in mobile malware lives. They target banking apps and cryptocurrency wallets, lifting credentials and authorising fraudulent transactions. Headline families: Anubis, Cerberus, SharkBot, Xenomorph, Vultur.

The standard playbook:

  • Overlay attacks: Painting a fake login screen on top of the real banking app.
  • SMS interception: Skimming one-time passwords delivered by text for 2FA.
  • Keylogging: Logging keystrokes through accessibility services.
  • Screen recording: Capturing the screen live — Vultur pioneered this with VNC-style streaming.
  • Remote access: Letting the operator drive the device themselves to push transactions through.

Spyware

Spyware sits quietly on the device and shovels data off it. The range runs from consumer-grade stalkerware sold under the banner of "parental monitoring" or "employee tracking" all the way up to state implants like Pegasus.

The capability menu rarely changes much: call recording, ambient microphone capture, camera access, location tracking, message interception (SMS, WhatsApp, Signal), contact and calendar exfiltration, browser history.

Stalkerware vs State-Sponsored Spyware

Stalkerware and state-sponsored spyware mostly differ in delivery and engineering, not in what they collect. Stalkerware needs physical access to the device and a manual install. Pegasus and its peers use zero-click exploits for remote, silent deployment. Both hoover up the same categories of data. The distinction matters for threat modelling, though — stalkerware leaves obvious traces (installed apps, configuration profiles), whilst state-grade spyware is engineered to be forensically invisible.

Ransomware

Mobile ransomware locks the screen or encrypts user files, then asks for money. Android variants typically lean on the device administrator API or accessibility services to keep the victim trapped on the ransom screen. File-encrypting ransomware is rarer here than on desktop, mostly because cloud-backed photo and document sync softens the blow of losing the local copy.

Adware and Click Fraud

Adware monetises by being annoying: full-screen interstitials, notification-bar ads, surprise browser tabs, ads quietly clicked in the background. It's less destructive than a banking trojan, but it routinely doubles as a dropper for nastier payloads. The numbers add up — adware families have been pulling in millions in fraudulent revenue before anyone notices.

Remote Access Trojans (RATs)

RATs hand the operator the keyboard. They bundle spyware-style surveillance with remote command execution, file management, and live screen sharing. AhMyth, SpyNote, and AndroRAT are the names that turn up most often in Android samples.

Here are the families named in this module, each card built from a vendor or researcher report you can open. Set the vector filter to "Zero-click exploit" and see which platform is left, then click the years in the strip: the banking trojans bunch up in a few years, and dashed names mark a report that wasn't the first.

Mobile malware families

Every field links to its source. Where no source we checked covers a field, the card says so instead of guessing. Vendors date families differently, so years are when the cited report came out.

Year of the report cited on each card

  1. 2012
  2. 2013
  3. 2014
  4. 2015
  5. 2016
  6. 2017
  7. 2018
  8. 2019
  9. 2020
  10. 2021
  11. 2022
  12. 2023

Solid outline: first public report. Dashed: a later report, a code release or a naming. Greyed: hidden by the filters.

Showing 12 of 12 families

Anubis

aka Anubis II, BankBot lineage
Banking trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • Google Play app or dropper: Droppers that slipped past Google Play's checks[1]
  • Sideloaded APK: SMS and email spam and fake landing pages pushing a fake app or update[1]
Persistence
Not covered by the sources cited
C2
Overlay targets are set from the C2; new C2 details are published through Twitter, Telegram and Pastebin[1]
Notable capability
Overlays, keylogging, screen streaming, SMS interception and a cryptolocker-style ransomware module[1]
Public reporting
Documented by ThreatFabric in 2019[1]ThreatFabric says it was rented out from Q4 2017 to February 2019, built on BankBot code its author published in December 2016.
  1. [1] ThreatFabric, Anubis II: malware and afterlife (2019)

Cerberus

Banking trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
Not covered by the sources cited
Persistence
Hides its launcher icon, uses accessibility to grant itself more permissions and resist removal, and disables Play Protect[1]
C2
Registers with the botnet and waits for C2 commands, with an auxiliary C2 list and modules it can update[1]
Notable capability
Credential and card-grabbing overlays, SMS theft and call forwarding; counts steps on the accelerometer to stay dormant in sandboxes[1]
Public reporting
First publicly reported by ThreatFabric in 2019[1]ThreatFabric found it being rented out on underground forums; its write-up doesn't say how devices were infected.
  1. [1] ThreatFabric, Cerberus: a new banking Trojan from the underworld (2019)

SharkBot

Banking trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • Sideloaded APK: Sideloading and social engineering; no samples on Google Play when Cleafy wrote it up[1]
Persistence
Hides its icon, uses accessibility to block uninstalling from Settings, and asks for a battery-optimisation exemption to stay connected through Doze[1]
C2
Encrypted, Base64-encoded traffic to C2 domains produced by a domain generation algorithm[1]
Notable capability
Automatic Transfer System (ATS): fills in fields in the real banking app and starts transfers from the infected device[1]
Public reporting
First publicly reported by Cleafy in 2021[1]
  1. [1] Cleafy, SharkBot: a new generation Android trojan (2021)

Xenomorph

Banking trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • Google Play app or dropper: “Fast Cleaner” on Google Play, a Gymdrop dropper with more than 50,000 installs[1]
Persistence
Grants itself the permissions it needs once it has accessibility, and blocks uninstallation[1]
C2
REST calls via Retrofit2: registers at a ping endpoint and polls for commands, with AES-encrypted messages and backup C2 domains[1]
Notable capability
Accessibility-driven overlays for banks, email and crypto wallets, plus SMS and notification interception for 2FA codes[1]
Public reporting
First publicly reported by ThreatFabric in 2022[1]
  1. [1] ThreatFabric, Xenomorph: a newly hatched banking trojan (2022)

Vultur

Banking trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • Google Play app or dropper: Brunhilda droppers on Google Play posing as fitness and 2FA apps[1]
Persistence
Installed as an update to the dropper's own package; hides its icon and presses Back when the user opens its app-details screen[1]
C2
JSON-RPC to the C2, commands over Firebase Cloud Messaging, and VNC sessions exposed through ngrok[1]
Notable capability
Records the screen with a VNC implementation when a targeted app is open, and keylogs through accessibility[1]
Public reporting
First publicly reported by ThreatFabric in 2021[1]
  1. [1] ThreatFabric, Vultur, with a V for VNC (2021)

Joker

aka Bread
Premium SMS and subscription fraudAndroid[2]
Infection vector
  • Google Play app or dropper: Google Play apps; Google said in January 2020 that it had removed 1,700 unique Bread apps before anyone downloaded them[2]
Persistence
Not covered by the sources cited
C2
Downloads billing-fraud steps at runtime, including JavaScript run in WebViews loaded from a server it controls[2]
Notable capability
Carrier billing fraud: older versions sent premium SMS, newer ones moved to toll fraud[2]
Public reporting
Publicly named by CSIS in 2019[1]Google, which calls it Bread, wrote in 2020 that it had been tracking the family since early 2017.
  1. [1] CSIS TechBlog, Analysis of Joker (2019)
  2. [2] MITRE ATT&CK, Bread (S0432)
  3. [3] Google Security Blog, PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) (2020)

Pegasus

Commercial spywareiOS[1]
Infection vector
  • One-click link: 2016: an SMS link that opened the Trident exploit chain in Safari[1]
  • Zero-click exploit: 2021: FORCEDENTRY, an iMessage exploit in CoreGraphics (CVE-2021-30860)[2]
Persistence
The 2016 implant re-ran the Trident chain at every boot through the JavaScriptCore binary, and switched off automatic updates[1]
C2
HTTPS beacons to C2 domains behind an anonymising proxy chain, with an SMS fallback for pushing new C2 details[1]
Notable capability
Records calls, turns on the microphone and camera, reads messages from iMessage, WhatsApp, Telegram and others, and takes keychain passwords[1]
Public reporting
First publicly reported by Citizen Lab and Lookout in 2016[1]
  1. [1] Citizen Lab, The Million Dollar Dissident (2016)
  2. [2] Citizen Lab, FORCEDENTRY (2021)

Predator

aka Cytrox, Intellexa
Commercial spywareiOSAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • One-click link: Links sent over WhatsApp; on iOS 14.6 the implant arrived about two minutes after the link opened in Safari[1]
Persistence
On iOS, a Shortcuts automation that runs when certain apps open, plus a profile that hides its notifications; the Android sample had none[1]
C2
A staged loader that fetches its configuration and further modules over HTTPS from attacker domains[1]
Notable capability
On Android, the ALIEN loader injects into Zygote and sets up what PREDATOR needs, including call and VoIP audio recording[2]
Public reporting
First publicly reported by Citizen Lab in 2021[1]Citizen Lab describes it as the first investigation to find Cytrox's spyware used against civil society.
  1. [1] Citizen Lab, Pegasus vs. Predator (2021)
  2. [2] Cisco Talos, Mercenary mayhem: Intellexa's Predator (2023)

QuaDream

aka Reign, KingsPawn
Commercial spywareiOS[1]
Infection vector
  • Zero-click exploit: ENDOFDAYS: invisible iCloud calendar invitations against iOS 14.4 and 14.4.2[1]
Persistence
Runs from a staging folder under com.apple.xpc.roleaccountd.staging and carries a self-destruct routine that wipes its traces[1]
C2
Exfiltrates over HTTPS POST and can pin a custom root certificate[1]
Notable capability
Records calls and ambient audio, takes photos, steals keychain items and generates iCloud 2FA codes for future dates[1]
Public reporting
Documented by Citizen Lab and Microsoft in 2023[1]Microsoft supplied the samples, which it calls KingsPawn; the vendor sold the spyware as Reign.
  1. [1] Citizen Lab, Sweet QuaDreams (2023)

AhMyth

Remote access trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • Google Play app or dropper: Radio Balouch, a working radio app, reached Google Play twice in July 2019 before removal[1]
  • Sideloaded APK: The same app on third-party stores and its own website[1]
Persistence
Not covered by the sources cited
C2
Radio Balouch sent device data and contacts to its own domain over unencrypted HTTP[1]
Notable capability
Steals contacts and files, sends SMS, and shows a fake login screen to collect credentials[1]
Public reporting
Code released publicly in 2017 (per ESET)[1]Open-source RAT; ESET found the first AhMyth-based app on Google Play in 2019.
  1. [1] ESET, First AhMyth-based spyware on Google Play (2019)

SpyNote

Remote access trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
Not covered by the sources cited
Persistence
Removes its app icon after install; the write-up describes hiding, not a persistence mechanism[1]
C2
A plain TCP socket to a hard-coded IP address and port[1]
Notable capability
Works without root: reads SMS and contacts, records the microphone, controls the camera, reports location and installs further APKs[1]
Public reporting
Documented by Unit 42 in 2016[1]Unit 42 analysed a builder that had leaked on malware forums and hadn't yet seen it used in attacks.
  1. [1] Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, SpyNote builder leaked (2016)

AndroRAT

Remote access trojanAndroid[1]
Infection vector
  • Sideloaded APK: 2018 variant posing as “TrashCleaner”, probably from a malicious URL; Google said it was never on Play[1]
Persistence
The 2018 variant hides its icon, runs in the background and uses CVE-2015-1805 to root the device for privileged actions[1]
C2
A remote server sends commands to the RAT service[1]
Notable capability
Records calls, captures the screen, runs shell commands, steals Wi-Fi passwords and can enable accessibility for keylogging[1]
Public reporting
Code released publicly in 2012 (per Trend Micro)[1]Began as an open-source university project; Trend Micro dates it to 2012.
  1. [1] Trend Micro, New AndroRAT exploits dated privilege escalation (2018)

Android vs iOS Malware Landscape

The split between Android and iOS malware is wildly lopsided. Android carries the overwhelming share of samples. The reason isn't that Android is weaker at the OS level. It's that the surrounding ecosystem is dramatically more open.

Why Android Has More Malware

  • Sideloading: Android lets you install APKs from anywhere. Toggle "unknown sources" and an APK from a website, messaging app, or shady third-party store will install just fine. Google Play Protect doesn't get a look-in.
  • Third-party app stores: Hundreds of alternative Android stores exist, plenty with token security review or none at all. Region-specific stores (particularly across China, where Play isn't available) are well-trodden distribution channels.
  • Fragmented updates: OEM fragmentation means security patches land on devices months or years after Google ships them — if they ever land at all. Phones from smaller OEMs sometimes never see another patch after they leave the shop.
  • Less restrictive review: Google Play's mostly-automated review catches less than Apple's human-in-the-loop App Review. The standard trick is to publish a clean app, pass review, then push malicious behaviour through dynamic code loading post-launch.

iOS Malware Constraints

  • No sideloading (standard): iOS won't install from arbitrary sources. Apps come through the App Store (reviewed by Apple), TestFlight (limited beta), or enterprise provisioning (requires a paid enterprise developer account and is increasingly clamped down on).
  • Mandatory code signing: Every executable carries an Apple-issued signature. Unsigned code can't run, even with root on a non-jailbroken device.
  • Jailbreak dependency: Traditional iOS malware needs a jailbreak to dodge code signing and sandboxing. That carves the target population down to a sliver.
  • State-sponsored exception: The heaviest-hitting iOS malware (Pegasus, Predator, QuaDream) uses zero-day exploit chains that bypass everything without a jailbreak. Different game, different price tag.
The Sideloading Divide

Sideloading is the single biggest reason Android has the malware ecosystem it has. When users can install from anywhere, authors can distribute through phishing links, fake app store websites, and plain old social engineering. iOS's App-Store-only model forces them to either slip through Apple's review (hard) or burn a zero-day exploit chain (state-sponsored only). The EU's Digital Markets Act has already opened a gap: since iOS 17.4 (March 2024), users in the EU can install from alternative marketplaces, though those apps still pass Apple's notarisation checks. Android is tightening from the other direction: from 30 September 2026, certified Android devices in Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand refuse to install apps from developers who haven't verified their identity with Google, wherever the app came from, with a global rollout planned from 2027. Installs over adb and an "advanced flow" for power users stay open.

Distribution Vectors

Fake Applications

The bread and butter. Authors knock together apps that impersonate popular ones (banking apps, social media, utilities) and push them through phishing websites mimicking official store pages, search-engine poisoning, social media ads, and SMS blasts urging users to install some "required update".

Trojanised SDKs

Legitimate developers unknowingly bundle a malicious SDK — typically an ad or analytics SDK — into their app. The SDK does what it says on the tin and a bit more besides. Classic supply chain: the developer's app passes review, but the SDK riding shotgun is poisoned.

Phishing

SMS phishing (smishing) and email phishing send users straight to malware download pages. Delivery services, banks, and government agencies are the standard masks. Urgency does the heavy lifting — "Your package is held", "Verify your identity" — and the install follows.

Zero-Click Exploits

The high-end vector, with no user interaction required. A crafted message — over iMessage, WhatsApp, anything that parses content automatically — triggers a bug in the message-parsing code, hitting code execution before the user sees so much as a notification. State-sponsored spyware lives here.

Android Persistence Mechanisms

After install, Android malware reaches for several tricks to stay put.

Device Administrator

The Device Administrator API was meant for legitimate MDM-style policy enforcement. Malware co-opts it: once admin is granted, ordinary uninstall is blocked, and the user has to dig into settings and revoke device admin first — assuming they can find the screen the malware's UI is busy hiding.

Accessibility Services

Accessibility hooks deep into the Android UI. Malware uses it to read every screen, fake gestures, and slap down removal attempts. To revoke the permission you have to walk through Settings, which the malware can spot — and then it just hits Back for you, automatically. Android 13 made the first step harder: an app installed from outside a store can't be granted accessibility until the user explicitly allows restricted settings for it, so droppers now walk victims through that toggle too.

Boot Receivers

A BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast receiver kicks the malware back up when the device boots. Pair that with a foreground service and you've got persistence that survives reboots without breaking a sweat.

Hiding Techniques

It also covers its tracks. Drop the launcher icon after first run, pick a transparent or innocuous icon and label, and register as a "system" app in the settings list — small things that keep casual users from spotting it.

Try classifying a few samples from their behaviour alone. For each one, name the category and the persistence trick it's most likely using.

  1. Requests BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE and SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW, ships an encrypted list of 200 package names, and talks to its server only when one of those apps is in the foreground.
  2. Asks for device admin on first launch, then shows a full-screen "police notice" and changes the lock-screen PIN.
  3. A wallpaper app whose icon disappears after first run, holds RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED, and loads ads in an invisible WebView every few minutes.
  4. Records the microphone on a schedule, uploads WhatsApp databases, and was installed by hand from an APK by someone with the unlocked phone.
Show the answer
  1. Banking trojan. The package list is its target list for overlays, and accessibility is both the keylogger and the thing that blocks removal.
  2. Screen-locking ransomware, with device admin doing the persistence (ordinary uninstall is blocked until admin is revoked).
  3. Adware with click fraud. Persistence is the boot receiver plus the hidden launcher icon.
  4. Stalkerware. The manual install is the tell; persistence is usually a boot receiver and a foreground service dressed up as something dull.

iOS Malware Challenges

iOS malware lives in a different universe from its Android counterpart, and the obstacles are structural:

  • No persistence without exploits: Without a kernel bug to patch the trust cache or bypass code signing, malware can't survive a reboot. Even high-end state implants were historically volatile.
  • No general sideloading path: Outside the EU's notarised alternative marketplaces, malware can't ride links or downloads onto the device — bar enterprise certificates, which Apple revokes aggressively the moment they show up in samples.
  • Limited API access: Inside the sandbox, the APIs malware actually wants aren't there. No background SMS access. No accessibility services equivalent. No overlay.
  • Aggressive memory management: iOS culls background apps quickly. You can't just sit around as a persistent background service.
  • Inactivity reboot: since iOS 18.1, an iPhone that stays locked for about 72 hours restarts itself. Apple's stated aim is to put the device back into the before-first-unlock state, where data protection keys are out of memory; flushing any volatile implant goes with it.

The upshot is that iOS malware is more or less the exclusive turf of well-resourced actors who can either build or buy zero-click exploit chains running into the millions.

Key Concept
Mobile Malware Persistence

Android malware persists through platform mechanisms such as boot receivers, foreground services, accessibility services, and device administrator privileges. iOS malware has far fewer persistence options due to the restrictive process lifecycle; sophisticated implants that survive outside the app sandbox typically do not survive device reboots on modern iOS. This asymmetry explains why Android has a vastly larger persistent malware ecosystem, whilst iOS threats concentrate at the state-sponsored level.